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Abstract 
This paper explores the untapped EU growth that could result from the 
better functioning of services markets and aims to bridge the gap between 
the EU policy debate, which is often framed in generalities about services, 
and the latest empirical economic analysis on the growth and productivity 
that might be generated by services markets. The authors find ample scope 
for further EU economic growth, both from domestic services reforms and 
from the deepening of the ‘single services market’. Domestic and EU-level 
services  reforms  are  so  intertwined  economically  that,  indeed,  we  may 
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Securing EU Growth from Services  
CEPS Special Report No. 67/October 2012 
Federica Mustilli and Jacques Pelkmans* 
1.  Why emphasise EU growth from services? 
The European Union (and perhaps even more so the eurozone) is wholly preoccupied with 
finding sources of economic growth at the moment. With extra public spending ruled out, 
private spending at best stagnant, almost no increase expected in labour and capital and little 
scope for a significant increase in R&D, the call for the better functioning of services markets 
in  Europe  grows  louder  all  the  time.  More  often  than  not,  however,  the  suggestion  of 
‘securing growth from services’ remains exceedingly general. It begs the question whether 
and how better functioning of the services markets could lead to higher growth in the EU. 
Indeed,  it  seems  that  when  referring  to  services  many  EU  leaders  and  observers  blend 
‘assertion’ with ‘hope’ in their attempts to send out a positive message in the crisis. This 
paper attempts to bridge the gap between the EU policy debate, which is often framed in 
generalities on services markets, and state-of-the-art empirical economic analysis on growth 
and productivity that better functioning services markets can boost growth in the Union.1 
Service activities have mattered for EU growth for many years now, as Figure 1 makes clear. 
During 13 of the 16 years depicted, the contribution of services to annual EU growth in terms 
of  value  added  is  greater  than  that  of  industry.  Services  markets  have  also  consistently 
generated job growth in the EU, as shown in Figure 2. It is therefore of utmost importance to 
Figure 1. Sectoral value-added contribution in the EU (% annual growth) 
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1 The authors have benefited from their participation in SERVICEGAP, an FP7 project funded by the 
European Commission, analysing the growth and productivity effects from the internationalisation of 
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 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2012). 
the EU economy to move the better functioning of services markets centre stage. We shall 
bring  together  empirical  economic  evidence  about  today’s  large,  untapped  EU  growth 
potential, which could be within reach once better policies and regulation are pursued at EU 
and national levels. 
Figure 2. Sectoral employment growth (% annual growth) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
The  economic  understanding  of  the  (good  and  bad)  functioning  of  services  markets  has 
improved markedly in recent years. Similarly, empirical knowledge about regulation and 
anti-competitive structures of various services markets in EU member states, and about the 
numerous  and  complex  barriers  within  the  EU  internal  services  market  has  drastically 
improved. And the grand experiment of the horizontal services Directive 2006/123 (initially 
known as the Bolkestein Directive) has turned out to be a blessing in disguise due to the 
intense domestic screening of services laws by member states, the 2010 mutual-evaluation 
exercise between member states and the active follow-up by the European Commission ever 
since. This recent empirical literature is helpful in making the case for better functioning 
national services markets and the proper functioning of the single market for services as a 
boon to higher EU economic growth. 
Section 2 of this report summarises the EU policy dimension in two complementary ways: 
the  internal  services  market  and  the  EU  aspects  of  domestic  reform  of  services  markets. 
Section 3 surveys the main empirical findings of recent economic research, providing a more 
robust economic underpinning of both services’ reform strategies. After first recalling the 
economic debate on the gap between the US and the EU in productivity growth (see section 
3.1), which widened suddenly after 1995 and is (largely) attributed to differences in services 
performance, we briefly address the importance of better functioning of services markets for 
European industry and its global value chains that are so critical for competitiveness (section 
3.2). In sections 3.3 and 3.4, the economic potential of, respectively, domestic services reforms 
and the EU single services market are discussed. Particularly striking is the interdependence 
in economic terms between the deepening of the EU internal services market and national 
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monetary union. Section 4 draws policy conclusions for both the EU and national services 
markets. 
2.  EU strategies for services reform 
The liberalisation of services is a latecomer to the process of European integration. And strategies 
were highly selective at first. The belated and slow deepening and widening of an EU services 
strategy  can  be  explained  by such  factors as  the priority  given  to  the  single EEC market  for 
goods,  the  initial  (often  powerful)  resistance  by  national  vested  interests, social  and  political 
sensitivities with respect to certain services (either because of their labour-intensity, the strategic 
nature of network industries or the public/universal service obligations of the latter), a lack of 
(economic)  understanding  of  services,  the  extremely  wide  range  of  service  types  and  the 
economic nature of services (most services are not easily ‘tradable’ across borders, and the kind 
of market failures involved generate complex regulatory issues). Finally, there is the problem of 
two-level government, with ‘domestic’ services remaining under national regulatory autonomy. 
The  relevant  articles  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  have 
remained very general and unchanged for 55 years. 
Moreover, in some services markets (e.g. freight rail, gas and electricity, road transport, air traffic 
control), the notion of a single market in services has to include a strategic and long-run approach 
to infrastructure investments, which introduces yet another two-level governance problem. The 
following stylised discussion of today’s EU services strategy distinguishes two ‘tracks’, which at 
were at first separate but recently have become increasingly interrelated: the single EU market for 
services and the domestic (reforms of) services markets, the latter being either in compliance with 
EU obligations or simply as domestic reform initiatives. 
2.1  Towards a single market for services 
After  ignoring  EU  services  markets  for  decades,  despite  free  movement  and  the  right  of 
establishment enshrined in the Rome Treaty, selective moves towards an internal services 
market  were  first  made  under  the  EC  1992  programme  for  financial services  and  the six 
modes  of  transport,  if  we  discount  highly  restrictive  forms  of  ‘mutual  recognition’  (of 
diplomas) in selected professional services. In the 1990s this was gradually broadened, via 
EU policies as well as case law, to horizontal services, culminating in the 2006/123 horizontal 
services  Directive,  and  to  network  industries  (broadcasting,  postal,  gas  and  electricity, 
telecoms, and the networked air and rail transport sectors). Professional services markets 
were also subjected to pressures to function better. At the same time, more attention was 
paid  at  EU  level  to  the  impact  of  better  functioning  of  services  markets  on  the 
competitiveness of European industry – whether EU-wide or nationally. With the arrival of 
the euro at the beginning of 1999, it became increasingly clear that shock absorption and 
permanent adjustment processes also depend on well-functioning services markets.  
Finally, the EU now seems to have accepted the inevitable logic of a single services market. 
With services now making up the largest share of economic activity (more than 70% of GDP), 
the economic importance of a single market for services cannot be overestimated. Yet, as far 
as the authors are aware, no credible estimate of its potential seems to have been published 
so far. The EU’s role in accomplishing a single services market consists of a combination of 
cross-border intra-EU liberalisation, EU regulation (when market failures so require) and EU 
competition policy, complemented where possible by mutual recognition. Given the huge 
variety of services (and the market failures involved in them), this is a complicated exercise. 
The complexity is further increased by omissions in the treaty, notably about independent 
EU regulatory agencies in the case of some network industries and in banking, and the deep 
resistance by holders of highly specific national powers to transfer such competences to the 
EU level, such as air traffic control or spectrum for telecoms or broadcasting.  4 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
It is useful, at this level of generality, to sketch out the panorama of market services for the 
single market, distinguishing three categories.  
A first, large category of services falls under the horizontal services Directive. Many such 
services are not tightly regulated, but some subsectors are, and they do not have ‘sectoral’ 
regimes at EU level.2 Altogether, their value added in the EU amounts to more than 45% of 
GDP. A second category comprises four groups of service sectors that are EU-regulated to 
different degrees, namely, professional services, financial and transport services and network 
industries.  Of  course,  professional  services  overlap  to  some  extent  with  the  regulated 
professions  under  the  services  Directive.  The  professions  referred  to  here  are  lawyers, 
accountants, architects, veterinarians, medical doctors, paramedical professions, pharmacists 
and  the  like.  A  combination  of  EU  diploma-recognition  regimes and  selective  EU  sector-
specific  requirements  (e.g.  for  auditing,  etc.)  have  created  a  blend  of  EU  and  national 
regulation, now also influenced by the services Directive 2006/123. This group of four (more 
or  less)  EU-regulated  services  generate  some  20%  of  EU  GDP,  with  network  industries 
accounting  for  some  4.7%  of  EU  GDP,  financial  services  almost  6%,  transport  3.1%  and 
professional  services  some  6%.3 Despite  all  the  recent  attention  surrounding  the  services 
Directive, this second category of services is of great economic importance in any EU services 
strategy. Today’s intra-EU cross-border services trade is dominated by the services that fall 
under the services Directive (see Figure 3), but this is not the case for the establishment of 
services providers in other EU member states via foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Figure 3. Intra-EU27 trade in services, exports in 2008 
 
                                                   
2 The main sectors are the regulated professions (note, regulated nationally but with a degree of EU 
mutual recognition), craftsmen, business-related services, distributive trades, tourism services, leisure 
services,  construction  services,  installation  &  equipment  maintenance,  information  services, 
accommodation & food services, training & education for profit, rental and leasing, real estate, testing 
& certification and commercial household support services. 
3 The contribution of professional services to EU GDP is hard to calculate. It has been suggested that 
professional services are a subset of ‘business services’ (11.7% of EU GDP), falling under the services 
Directive  2006/123.  However,  this  is  only  partially  the  case.  The  2007  European  Commission 
“Handbook on the Implementation of the Directive” (p. 10) speaks of “most” regulated professions 
and adds “business-related services”, a category employed by Eurostat. The Directive itself, in recital 
33, does mention “business services” and sums up a range of professional services, but it is far from 
exhaustive. Eurostat defines “business services” as NACE K72 and NACE K74.1 – 74.5: all of these 
activities fall under the services Directive, including the professional services specified in these NACE 
categories. The professional services not falling under the services Directive would include all medical 
professions,  paramedical  professions,  veterinarians,  pharmacists,  notaries,  interpreters  and  several 
others. The present authors suggest that professions under the services Directive contribute 4% to EU 
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Source: Eurostat (2012). 
As Figure 4 shows, cross-border intra-EU FDI in services is dominated by financial services 
providers (61%) and network industries (10%) and not at all by activities under the Services 
Directive. 
Figure 4. Intra-EU27 FDI in services, abroad in 2008 
 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
A third category comprises several ‘special’ services activities, which are hard to classify and 
currently addressed at EU level in an ad hoc fashion.4  
 One should be careful when interpreting simple one-liners about the economic importance 
of services liberalisation in the EU. Thus, the European Commission’s reiteration that the 
economic  activity  generated  by  services  falling  under  the  horizontal  services  directive  is 
more than 40% of EU GDP does not mean that all or many of these services providers are 
potentially  interested,  or  even  capable,  of  entering  cross-border  activities  in  a  systematic 
fashion – far from it. A similar one-liner one often hears is that the EU has 23 million SMEs 
and most of them are in services. This says very little indeed about potential. Even in the 
internal market for goods, companies exploiting the internal market are really ‘the happy 
few’.5 In services, barriers are more numerous than in goods and not always transparent, 
tradability is low and selective, whilst establishment is not going to be an easy decision for 
                                                   
4 They include temporary cross-border services provision, often more lightly or not regulated except 
host-country control for wages under the Posted Workers Directive 96/71; medical services to patients 
from other EU countries under Directive 2011/24; gambling (where case law has grown but no EU 
rules exist as yet); taxis & ambulance services and private security services (taken out of the Bolkestein 
Directive, with no solution found so far). 
5 See Ottaviano & Mayer (2008), for a survey, based on firm-level data, on how few companies actually 
participate in a few EU countries, let alone in many EU countries, in the EU single market. This work 
only  focuses  on  intra-EU  trade,  not  FDI  which  is quite  important  for  services  given  the  low/zero 
tradability of many services. The successful, competitive companies actively exploiting the internal 
market  perhaps  number tens  of  thousands,  the  broader  group  of  ‘partial’  participants  (serving  or 
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most SMEs. The potential for SMEs exploiting the single services market is therefore far from 
clear.6 
Estimating the potential for growth for the four categories of sectorally regulated services 
hinges  on  a  proper  understanding  of  the  accomplishments  (in  cross-border  intra-EU 
liberalisation, harmonisation where relevant and competition policy) with a view to realise a 
single market. To illustrate the complexity of the system in financial markets, for instance, 
the third EU regime (realised under the Financial Services Action Plan of 2000-2006) was 
accompanied by rapid European financial market integration. It was first estimated that this 
could add 1% to EU GDP (Giannetti et al., 2002); perhaps more in the longer run. However, 
this assumed that market failures in financial markets had been effectively addressed. The 
current financial crisis (begun barely two years after the revisions of the banking and capital 
requirements directives in June 2006) has revealed that prudential rules and supervision did 
not protect the European economy against market failures as previously supposed and had 
not  addressed  the  related  problem  of  financial  stability.  The  fourth  EU  financial  markets 
regime,  largely  now  in  place  (except  for  some  crucial  items  such  as  a  credible  EU  bank 
resolution regime, with EU funds and an EU-wide deposit insurance regime; also, financial 
supervision is not truly centralised where it matters most) is probably better able to price 
risks and pre-empt prudential and systemic risks from getting out of hand, but of course this 
comes at a cost. What the potential economic growth will be under the fourth regime once 
the EU is out of the crisis is exceedingly hard to ‘guesstimate’.  
In professional services, the Commission has proposed a useful simplification (e.g. with an 
EU-wide  professional  card  system)  but,  for  a  true  single  market,  much  more  will  be 
necessary, such as a drastic reduction (indeed, a proper justification) of nationally ‘regulated’ 
professions based on market failures or indispensable national properties, and other ways to 
enhance competition via entry and/or imports. This is as yet unchartered territory and the 
pro-competitive gains are therefore unknown. It is still true that markets for professional 
services  exhibit  anti-competitive  characteristics  (see  e.g.  Bottini  &  Molmar,  2010  on  high 
mark-ups) but to what extent this is due to market failures that are hard to overcome fully 
(e.g. extreme asymmetries of information) and/or anti-competitive regulation is not so easy 
to determine.  
In network industries, much liberalisation so far has been ‘national’ (although based on EU 
rules  and  EU  competition  principles)  but  a  single  market  still  seems  a  long  way  away,7 
except  in  air  transport  and  broadcasting  (although  fragmentation  based  on  languages 
remains extremely strong). In transport, the internal market is basically accomplished (apart 
from rail) but the 2011 White Paper [COM(2011) 144] (European Commission, 2011) shows 
that the growth potential ought to be assessed in a much wider framework of radical cuts of 
CO2  emissions  and  huge  investment  in  infrastructure.  In  gas  and  electricity,  formidable 
investment in (cross-border and other) infrastructure over many years is a prerequisite of a 
                                                   
6 In comparing the EU SME population with that of the US, there seems to be a ‘missing middle’ of 
larger European SMEs in four sectors: distribution, hotels/restaurants, transport & communication 
and business services (we thank Peter Smith for this observation). See also Kox (2012), emphasising 
the dominance  of  micro-enterprises  in EU  business  services, which are  sub-scale  and  incapable  of 
exploiting the single market, and section 3.2.  
7 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue in any detail. For an analysis of the failure to 
develop a single eComms market, see Pelkmans & Renda (2011); for the shortcomings of the third gas 
and  electricity  package  of  2009  in  realising  a  single  market,  see Kapff  &  Pelkmans  (2010);  in  rail 
freight,  enormous  (corridor)  infrastructure  and  interoperability  issues  combine  with  unfulfilled 
intermodal investment needs, divergent infra-user fees and too weak EU directives, see e.g. the Single 
EU Railway Area in COM (2010) 474 and the follow-up in the Council and EP (EurActiv, 6 July 2012). SECURING EU GROWTH FROM SERVICES | 7 
 
well-functioning  EU  energy  services  market.  For  telecoms,  nowadays  called  electronic 
communications (basically, transport of bits, also for broadcasting or internet audio-visual 
services),  European  infrastructure  shortcomings  are  also  formidable  e.g.  in  broadband 
investments for very fast internet and spectrum allocation. In freight rail the (10) European 
corridors  can  only  fulfil  the  badly-needed  potential  of  radically  lower  costs  and  greater 
reliability  if  major  and  often  complex  investments  in  new  track,  marshalling  yards, 
signalling, intermodal terminals, etc. are effectively undertaken. Thus, the growth potential 
in some network industries is not merely a question of liberalising services across intra-EU 
borders,  but  just  as  much  the  combination  of  cross-border  intra-EU  liberalisation,  the 
promotion of competitive markets and huge and sustained infrastructural investments over 
a considerable period. It goes without saying that this renders an economic estimate of the 
gains from these segments of the single market more difficult and somewhat arbitrary. Even 
if the European Commission (2007) were right in claiming that the proposed third electricity 
package (adopted in 2009 although in a less ambitious framework) could add 0.6% of EU 
GDP based on price convergence by market coupling (see Zachmann, 2010 on this point, 
however),  this  does  not  take  account  of  the  probable  GDP  boost  arising  from  huge 
investment in power stations and interconnectors over two decades. Similarly, the expected 
array  of  new  services  and  innovation  prompted  by  advanced  broadband  hinges  on  the 
widespread availability of broadband throughout the EU internal market, including in less 
densely populated areas.  
Finally, estimating the growth potential of temporary cross-border services provision (and 
their pro-competitive impact) has not even yet begun because of severe data problems and 
the fact that many barriers to these activities were only significantly reduced after 2006. A 
rough proxy of this activity’s importance before the crisis can be given8 if one considers that 
some 1 million workers were ‘posted’ annually in the period 2007-09. This would be a mix of 
workers from new member states (one-third) and EU-15 workers. For the 10 Central and 
Eastern European EU countries, the remittances from posted workers amount to some 1.3% 
of GDP (80% of all their remittances). The posted workers from the EU-15 have, on average, a 
higher-skill profile and are twice as numerous, so it is possible that their wage income from 
posting is as high as (say) 0.5% of EU-15 GDP. The total turnover of temporary cross-border 
services must be higher as it includes other costs and profits.  
2.2  Reforms of domestic services markets 
The  performance  of  domestic  services  markets  is,  of  course,  also  crucial  for  European 
economic growth. However, this is traditionally regarded as a matter falling under national 
regulatory  autonomy.  Given  subsidiarity  tests,  the  EU  level  should  not  encroach  upon 
domestic autonomy unless there is an explicit, well-justified case (see e.g. Pelkmans, 2005) 
and if EU tools fall under the treaty category of ‘shared powers’. But does it make sense in a 
deeply integrated European economy to draw strict boundaries between ‘domestic services 
regimes’  and  the  ‘EU  regime  for  cross-border  service  activities’,  not  least  because 
establishment in another EU country is always possible (and happens frequently) for market 
services?  For  non-market  services  (e.g.  social  services),  pure  government  services  and 
services predominantly financed by national or regional governments (say, basic health and 
educational  services,  or  public  radio/TV),  this  distinction  seems  fine.  Market  services, 
                                                   
8 European Commission (2012), Employment and social developments in Europe, November, pp. 257-
259 and pp. 277-278. Note that seasonal work in tourism, horticulture and agriculture is not included 
here. Also, some high-skilled temporary cross-border services (e.g. management consulting; technical 
& engineering advice) are not likely to be caught by the (social) registration under the posted workers 
Directive. The same applies to single-person firms providing cross-border temporary services.  8 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
however,  are  in  principle  part  and  parcel  of  the  internal  market  (that  is,  exposed  to 
competition when serving other national markets or by imported services) and the question 
is whether that is sufficient reason for the EU level to be actively involved. Taking the notion 
of  a  single  services  market  seriously,  EU  involvement  can  only  be  highly  intrusive  for 
domestic  services  regimes.  As  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  screening  and  ‘mutual 
evaluation’  of  national  reforms  in  services  during  the  implementation  of  the  horizontal 
services Directive,  the  removal  of  intra-EU  barriers  critically  depends  on the  abolition  or 
reform of domestic services regulation. After all, barriers in the internal services market are 
‘behind-the-(intra-EU)-border’ measures, not frontier measures. Nevertheless, a considerable 
amount of domestic regulation can stay in place or represents a difficult trade-off, depending 
on the justification. Figure 5 on the removal or reduction of access barriers to the German 
market for services illustrates this very well. 
Figure 5. Domestic reforms due to the Services Directive in Germany 
Source: Monteagudo et al. (2012, Annex). 
Besides this fundamental issue of intertwined domestic and ‘EU-relevant’ regulation, there 
are  two  other  reasons  that  prompted  increasing  EU  involvement  in  domestic  services 
regimes, with a view to promoting growth and smoother adjustment. First, services reform is 
frequently talked about today but, in fact, much of it pre-dated the so-called ‘Cardiff process’ 
that was set up in the run-up to the 2000 Lisbon process and beyond. It is based on what is 
now Art. 121, TFEU about “(national) economic policy as a matter of common concern” via 
policy coordination and multilateral surveillance of the implementation of recommendations 
or guidelines. This is about mutual persuasion, based on analysis, and peer pressure, for the 
common good (such as higher EU growth). In 2000 the Cardiff report9 concludes: 
Further efforts are required to promote stronger competition in service sectors such 
as retail trade and professional services. This is especially true for those services not 
covered  by  Single  Market  legislation.  For  example,  reducing  legal  entry  and  exit 
barriers can improve the quality and efficiency of these more sheltered markets. 
Progress  has  been  made  since  then  but  this  is  uneven  among  member  states.  In  the 
Commission’s Product  Market  Review  2010-2011,  one  reads  however  that  the  very same 
concern articulated in 2000 is still prominent for services, which 
would  therefore  do  well  to  review  …  specifically  entry  and  exit  conditions…  to 
encourage entrepreneurship (European Commission 2010b, p. 3). 
                                                   
9 EU Economic Policy Committee (2000), Second annual report on structural reforms – 2000, Brussels, 
13 March, EPC/ECFIN/241/00, p. 4. SECURING EU GROWTH FROM SERVICES | 9 
 
In the Review, a modelling exercise suggests that structural reforms in EU countries (which 
of course include also labour market reforms) would push the expected EU annual trend 
growth of 1½% by 2020 to 2.2% (p. 2), which is significant.  
The second other EU (or rather: eurozone) reason to promote domestic services reform is the 
proper functioning of the monetary union. The purpose here is to achieve relatively low-cost 
and rapid absorption of (especially idiosyncratic) shocks, which minimises the cumulative 
loss of growth from such shocks. We shall return to this point in the conclusions. 
3.  Better services performance: What economic research tells us 
3.1  Comparative productivity growth analysis 
Low growth in the productivity of services in EU member states, both comparatively (e.g. 
with  the  US)  and  absolutely,  is  certainly  a  principal  reason  for  the  better  functioning  of 
services markets via reforms to have been advocated repeatedly. Since 1995, EU productivity 
growth in services has fallen to a low annual average precisely when that of the US increased 
sharply. Many economic scholars were intrigued by this trend change, after decades of EU 
catch-up. Empirical analysis quickly detected that productivity growth differentials, in just a 
few  services  sectors,  were  the  main  cause  of  the  trend  change.  This  empirical  economic 
analysis has been much refined since. Table 1 shows the average annual labour productivity 
growth disparities in all market services (annually 1% for the EU versus 3% for the US over 
10 years since 1995, in contrast to productivity growth over 1980-95) and the two sectors 
responsible for it (distribution, wholesale and retail; and business services). 
Table 1. Sectoral labour productivity growth in market services, 1980-2005 
(average annual percentage points) 
 
Sources: Timmer et al. (2010), based on EU KLEMS database. 
According to Timmer et al. (2010), whilst the US was experiencing acceleration since the mid-
1990s, caused by a combination of an increase in investment for ICT-using sectors and a 
subsequent productivity growth in market services, the EU witnessed a strong slowdown in 
multifactor productivity, mainly in trade, finance and business services. 
The US-EU productivity growth gap, which still persists, notwithstanding the effect of the 
financial turmoil,10 has mainly been driven by the ICT sector inducing an increase in capital 
deepening and total factor productivity growth in the US. In contrast, the EU suffered a 
persistent  lag  caused  by  various  rigidities  and  hindrances  that  prevented  an  effective 
exploitation of the potential of ICT, especially on the business user side. Detailed empirical 
economic research at firm-level clarifies how ICT may boost growth. Van Reenen et al. (2010) 
                                                   
10 During the period 2007-09, the US performance reversed the usual pro-cyclical pattern that can be 
observed in productivity growth trends. According to Timmer et al. (2010), while the EU has shown a 
slowdown of -0.7% in productivity growth, the US experienced an increase of 1.6% in the same period. 
1980-1995 1995-2005 1980-1995 1995-2005
Market Service Labour Productivity 1.4 1 1.5 3
Distribution Services contribution  1.1 0.7 1.2 1.5
Financial Services Contribution 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5
Business Service Contribution 0 -0.1 -0.1 0.7
Personal Service Contribution -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Contribution from labour reallocation 0.1 0 0 0
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find  that  disparities  in  ICT-driven  productivity  growth  between  countries  are  largely 
explained  by  i)  labour  market  and  services  regulation  restrictiveness,  and  ii)  skills  and 
organisational capital inside firms – essentially people management and decentralisation of 
decision-making and responsibilities. The authors stress that the ICT productivity effect they 
detect is reduced by 45% if labour regulations are strict and by 16% if services regulation is 
strict. There is little doubt that, on the whole, labour market regulation in continental Europe 
is much stricter than in the US, with the UK and Ireland in intermediate positions. This is 
broadly  reflected  in  the  findings  of  Van  Reenen  et  al  (2010).  People  management  inside 
enterprises  is  also  influenced  by  labour  laws  and  collective  agreements:  if  the  latter  are 
relatively strict, ICT-driven productivity growth will be lower. Also, decentralised structures 
show a strong interaction with ICT: with decentralisation, the impact of ICT investment is 
one-third higher.11 The authors also establish that multinational firms use ICT much more 
than  domestic  firms  –  a  finding  that  is  crucial  for  the  economic  assessment  of  the 
establishment  section  of  the  services  Directive  (having  removed  a  range  of  significant 
barriers to FDI in services such as the ‘economic needs’ test, etc.). We return to this point in 
section  3.4.  It  should  be  noted  that,  although  without  firm-level  data  and  sophisticated 
econometrics, Barrios & Burgelman (2008) find that, in the EU and comparing the EU with 
the US, ICT investment and its related growth impact are significantly lower in countries 
with rigid, heavily regulated credit, services and labour markets. They speak about an ICT 
deterrence effect of strict regulation. 
Brynjolfsson  (2011),  based  on  his  groundbreaking  work  on  the  intra-firm  and  market 
dynamics  of  ICT-driven  innovation,  holds  that there  are  three  ways  in  which  ICT  raises 
productivity  growth:  by  enhancing  ICT  equipment  itself  (e.g.  faster  computers),  by 
catalysing  organisational  change  and,  above  all,  by  transforming  the  innovation  process 
itself. Although the latter is not unique to services, in (some) services sectors it may engender 
disruptive  effects  that  are  truly  ‘Schumpeterian’.12 There  would  seem  to  be  no  obvious 
reason why the first way should be different for US and EU companies, since upgraded ICT 
equipment is usually immediately available worldwide. The second way (catalysing intra-
firm organisational change) has been found to be more problematic in Europe than in the US 
(Van Reenen et al., 2010; Brynjolfsson, 2011; European Commission, 2003). That ICT alters 
the innovation process itself – the third way – and renders it faster and more disruptive is a 
crucial  insight  and  certain  service  sectors  (logistics,  retail,  wholesale,  postal  services, 
advertising, etc.) are profoundly affected.13  
A number of other ICT issues may also help to explain disparities in US-EU productivity 
growth in recent years. We shall discuss some internal market questions in section 3.4. In 
addition, broadband investments, relatively low R&D in ICT in Europe, the lack of leading 
ICT firms in Europe14 and demand-side aspects such as e-Inclusion all play a role15 and affect 
the link between ICT services and economic growth.  
                                                   
11 Even when controlling for ‘fixed effects’ econometrically.  
12 Meaning the dynamic type of competition characterised by ‘creative destruction’, rather than pro-
competitive activities in a market where services or goods and their production methods are all given. 
13 Brynjolfsson (2011) sees a sequence of four mutually reinforcing innovative activities: improved and 
faster  measurement  of  market  activity  in  real  time,  faster  and  cheaper  business  experimentation 
(internet firms can do this), the swift sharing of new insights and the rapid replication of new services 
or  processes,  reaching  all  outlets  without  exceptional  efforts.  Altogether,  this  may  engender 
Schumpeterian competition, leading new entrants to challenge incumbents in many services markets.  
14 Veugelers (2012) shows that the EU lacks leading platform-providers who can capture the value in 
the  “new  ICT  eco-system”. Besides the absence of  ICT  clusters  and the  lack  of  an  entrepreneurial SECURING EU GROWTH FROM SERVICES | 11 
 
3.2  How services reform can support industrial competitiveness 
A complementary stream of the economic literature on services focuses on the interaction 
between manufacturing and services. Manufacturing companies are increasingly including 
services both on the output (in particular, maintenance and repair service, business advisory 
services, sales services, pre- and after-sales services) and the input side (through services 
purchased,  both  domestically  and  internationally).  As  shown  in  Figure  6,  the  ratio  of 
purchased services in manufacturing increased steadily in the EU15 from 1980 to 2005. 
Figure 6. The ratio of purchased services to output in EU10 and EU15 
 
Note: Indicator is defined as the share of purchased services compared to manufacturing output. 
Source: Falk et al. (2011). 
From  the  interlinkage  between  the  two  sectors,16 one  should  expect  a  trend  growth  of 
services  jobs  in  manufacturing  (Falk  et  al.,  2011).  One  might  explore  two  possible  ways 
through which this interdependence can boost domestic growth, that is, by identifying the 
trend increase of services occupations in manufacturing over time and by analysing how the 
share of services purchased is linked to the export competitiveness of EU businesses. 
As for the first channel, Falk & Jarocinska (2010) and Falk & Peng (2011), taking advantage of 
a large firm-level data set for 18 EU member states, find a positive relationship between the 
employment  share  of  services  occupations  and  the  output  share  of  producer  services  in 
                                                                                                                                                               
culture, she points to venture capital, fragmented IPR regimes and the lack of a digital single market 
(see section 3.4) as culprits.  
15 The demand side in the EU may be below potential due to insufficient e-Inclusion, that is, segments 
of the population (one-third) having no computer linked to the internet and/or no skills to use it. For 
SMEs,  e-Inclusion  can  be  below  potential  because  of  the  lack  of  e-skills  at  various  levels  of  ICT 
ambition. In Guerrieri & Bentivegna (2011) it is shown that better e-Inclusion leads to a positive effect 
on EU GDP via higher TFP (total factor productivity).  
16 Many consumer services, according to Peter Smith, including health and social services, constitute a 
significant segment of services with relatively few inputs from manufacturing and vice versa. Indeed, 
some of these sectors barely participate in the internal market as they are local or ‘domestic’ and often 
funded  by  government  policies  or  public  procurement.  In  Pelkmans  et  al.  (2008)  it  is  empirically 
shown that the trend increase in prices of these services over time is higher than for other services. 
This could be due to a lack of competition, whether domestic or European, and/or ‘Baumol’s law’, 
which holds that a rise of salaries in jobs that have not experienced an increase of labour productivity 
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manufacturing. They show that the increasing demand of a particular service linked to the 
production  of  a  specific  good  stimulates  the  firm  to  acquire  the  knowledge  required  to 
produce that service in-house. This implies that the increase in the output share of services 
explains an average 13% increase in the share of service occupations.  
The  second  channel  is  the  effect  of  services  imported  or  purchased  domestically  on  the 
export performance of the manufacturing industry. Data show that this channel counts more 
in countries where KIBS (knowledge-intensive business services)17 account for a significant 
part of the services purchased. Wolfmayr (2011), in her contribution to SERVICEGAP, shows 
that the more services are purchased by the firm, the higher the share of goods exported. 
Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the link holds when services are imported and not 
when  purchased  domestically.  This  strongly  suggests  that  cross-border  services  trade 
(presumably, mainly in the internal EU services market, given proximity constraints) exerts a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of industrial firms. 
If this empirical relation turns out to be robust, it means that an important element of EU 
industrial and competitiveness policy is to further liberalise the EU single services market 
and stimulate domestic services reforms as well. The latter should bring about more effective 
rivalry,  which  should  help  some  domestic  services  suppliers  to  compete  directly  with 
services imports for their use as inputs in manufacturing. 
Kox (2012) zooms in on the largest cluster of services inputs, namely, business services. He 
shows that the productivity of EU business services has stagnated for years and finds that 
this is largely due to weak competitive pressures at home and low degrees of openness for 
imports  (confirming  Wolfmayr,  2011,  for  trade).  Greater  market  selection  would  require 
fiercer competitive rivalry, but this is often hindered by rigidities or protective regulation or 
labour  market  restrictions.  The  first  effect  of  such  selection  would  be  a  shift  from  less 
productive to more productive firms; the second effect consists of fewer very small service 
suppliers, which are clearly suboptimal in size, and more room for larger suppliers. Kox 
simulates two 'reforms', combining different combinations of greater openness and lower 
regulatory  costs.  The  gains  in  total  efficiency  can  reach  7%  and  4.5%,  respectively.  This 
implies that the 'knock-on' effects for industry would thereby become more favourable for 
the competitiveness of European manufacturers. 
3.3  On domestic services reforms  
The economic literature suggests that part of the growth that can be generated by service 
sectors finds its origin in domestic reform efforts, whether the result of the implementation 
of the 2006 services Directive (as noted, this must imply some domestic reform) or national 
attempts to reduce restrictiveness of services markets at home, possibly complemented by 
greater flexibility in national labour markets. Here we focus on domestic services reforms 
illustrated by the OECD regulatory restrictiveness indicators called PMRs.18  
                                                   
17 KIBS is not well defined across the literature. However, according to the European Competitiveness 
Report (2011), KIBS can be identified through the following NACE categories: Computer and related 
services (NACE 72), Research and Development (NACE 73) and Other business services (NACE 74). The 
last category includes a large variety of sub-sectors. Indeed, from 74.1 to 74.8, NACE 74 includes legal, 
accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; 
business and management consultancy; holdings, architectural and engineering activities and related technical 
consultancy, advertising, labour recruitment and provision of personnel, investigation and security activities, 
industrial  cleaning,  miscellaneous  business  activities  not  elsewhere  classified  (photographic  activities, 
secretarial and translation activities) 
18 The OECD PMRs (product market restrictiveness indicators) cannot be explained here, given the 
space constraints. See Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2003) and Woelfl et al. (2009) for the methodology as well SECURING EU GROWTH FROM SERVICES | 13 
 
The OECD work focuses on the better economic functioning of markets by zooming in on the 
restrictive  effects  of  state  control,  trade  and  investment  barriers  and  barriers  to 
entrepreneurship,  while  ignoring  regulation  of health, safety,  environment  and  consumer 
protection (the ‘non-economic’ functioning of markets). However, in services, asymmetries 
of  information  lead  to  many  instances  and  intensities  of  regulation  some  of  which  are 
included  for  purposes  of  consumer/investor  protection  and  better  economic  market 
functioning (e.g. professionals, financial regulation). Also network industries usually require 
a combination of regulation (and indeed a regulator) and competition policy for purposes of 
better market functioning. The question in these two types of markets is whether and to what 
extent  such  needed  regulation  can  be  least-restrictive,  thereby  allowing  market  forces  to 
work  more  freely  and  hence  stimulate  growth.  Arnold  et  al.  (2011)  provide  persuasive 
empirical  evidence  that  countries  with  low  PMRs  have  experienced  higher  productivity 
growth.  
The restrictiveness of services market regulation in EU countries has gone down over time as 
shown by Figures 7 and 8.19 
Figure 7. Development of aggregate product market regulation since 1998 
 
Note: Index scale of 0-6 from least to most restrictive. 
Source:  OECD, Product Market  Regulation  Database,  reproduced  in  “The  Revised  OECD  Indicator  of  PMR”, 




                                                                                                                                                               
as Arnold et al. (2011); for a critical discussion of PMRs when applied to EU countries, see Pelkmans 
(2010). It should be noted that, although the early stage of PMRs (mid- and late 1990s) focused both on 
goods  and  services  markets,  the  revised  PMRs  (since  2006)  largely  measure  services  markets 
regulation. 
19 We have used graphs from the CESifo Dice Report because the resolution in the original ones from 
Woelfl et al. (2009) is too low. Although they use the same database, Figure 8 gives a somewhat lower 
reform effort in telecoms than Woelfl et al. (2009); still, the overall conclusion in the text is clearly 
supported. 14 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
Figure 8. Sources of reform in product market regulation by sector 
 
Note: Index scale of 0-6 from least to most restrictive. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database, reproduced in “The Revised OECD Indicator of 
PMR”, CESifo DICE Report, autumn 2010, p. 35 
However, there is little doubt that a further stimulus of effective competition in several of 
these markets can still be accomplished. Restrictive services regulation beyond what it takes 
to address market failures has no public interest justification - merely hinders better market 
performance. This is first of all a domestic problem in many EU member states, but, at the 
same  time,  it  also has  repercussions  for  the  internal  services  market,  because  unjustified 
regulation implies barriers to cross-border services exchange or via establishment of service 
firms by non-domestic EU firms. Moreover, when manufacturing firms want (or have) to use 
services  as  input  into  their  production  or  value-chains,  competitive  services  sectors  will 
obviously  benefit  industry  too.  With  the help  of  PMRs, Conway  &  Nicoletti  (2006)  have 
calculated ‘knock-on’ effects from (restrictive) services markets to industry. 
Figure  9 shows  that,  given  different  levels  of  restrictiveness  between EU member  states’ 
services markets, a relatively high knock-on effect can become a drag on the competitiveness 
of  industrial  enterprises  in  the more  regulated countries.  As  long  as  reforms  ensure  that 
market  failures  are  not  re-introduced  or  taken  too  lightly,  pro-competitive  reforms  in 
services markets would therefore boost the competitiveness of industry. 
It should be noted that Barone & Cingano (2011) reach very similar conclusions, highlighting 
the negative indirect effects of anti-competitive regulation on downstream industries using 
services  as  inputs.  Barone  &  Cingano  find  that  too  restrictive  service  regulation  has  a 
significant negative effect on the growth rate of value-added, productivity and exports of 
service-dependent  industries  (with  energy  supply  services  and  professional  services  as 
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Figure 9. The impact of non-manufacturing regulation on the manufacturing sector, 2003 
 
Note: Scale normalised to 0-1 from least to most restrictive of competition. 
Source: Conway & Nicoletti (2006). 
But this knock-on effect differs not only between countries; sectoral differences matter too. 
Figure 10 shows that, in 2003, it is larger in all countries (except the UK) for ICT-using sectors 
than for non-ICT using sectors. Nevertheless, in this respect, countries differ considerably as 
well, implying that there is likely to be room for regulatory reform in services, which would 
engender a positive impact on productivity via more competitive intermediate ICT-service 
input in ICT-using industries, which in turn, would strengthen industrial competitiveness. 
As shown above, ICT-related activities are crucial for boosting overall productivity growth.  
Figure 10. The burden of non-manufacturing regulation on ICT-using and non-ICT using sectors, 
2003 
 
Note: Scale normalised to 0-1 from least to most burdensome. According to the authors, the figure 
shows  the regulation  impact  indicator,  which reflects  the  burden  of  anti-competitive regulation  in 
non-manufacturing sectors on industries that use the output of these sectors as intermediate inputs 
into the production process. 
Source: Arnold et al. (2011). 16 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
Focusing on domestic services regulation of OECD countries, Arnold et al. (2011) study the 
link between product market regulations, resource allocation and productivity growth with 
the help of OECD restrictiveness. Lower regulatory burdens tend to facilitate a reallocation 
of resources to the highest productivity firms. A regulation not properly designed to ensure 
proper market  functioning  can,  for  instance,  hinder  innovation  and  impede  efficient  and 
effective  market  entry.  The  negative  effect  of  anti-competitive  regulation  on  productivity 
growth can be transmitted through two different channels. First, Arnold, et al. (2011) show 
that the stronger the ability of countries to absorb new technology or innovation, the greater 
is the negative effect of anti-competitive regulation on productivity. This result would seem 
to  apply  especially  to  EU15  countries  or  at  least  to  most  of  them.  The  channel  can  be 
analyzed both at industry-level where, as for ICT services, inappropriate regulation can slow 
down productivity growth precisely where it is most promising, and at firm-level where the 
degree of regulatory heterogeneity amongst EU countries can negatively affect productivity 
growth by the discouragingly high fixed costs of entry for no less than 27 national markets. 
The  second  channel  originates  from  so-called  ‘market  selection’,  competitive  market 
pressures  promoting  resources  reallocation  from  less  to  more  efficient  firms,  which  is  a 
significant  source  of  growth.  However,  anti-competitive  regulation  is  likely  to  protect 
incumbents  or  inefficient  practices  and  thereby  throttle  re-allocation  processes.  Such 
regulations  can  negatively  affect  the  willingness  of  incumbents  to  promote  innovations 
whilst discouraging new entrants (only large new entrants are capable of overcoming such 
negative incentives). 
One might get an idea of the range of possible labour productivity improvements if domestic 
services  reforms  in  all  EU  countries  could  be  simulated  to  go  all  the  way  to  the  least 
restrictive,  best-practice  examples  in  the  OECD for  all  sectors.  Of  course,  this  is perhaps 
somewhat academic since no OECD country has the best-practice regime in every sector. 
Based on a variant of the Aghion–Howitt (dynamic) growth model and making use of the 
‘knock-on’  effects  in  Figures  8  and  9,  Arnold  et  al.  (2009)  arrive  at  changes  in  labour 
productivity  (after  10  years)  between  7%  (Spain)  or  8%  (the  Netherlands,  Finland  and 
Denmark) up to as high as 14% (Belgium and the Czech Republic) and even 19% for Poland 
and Hungary; France would enjoy 10% and Italy 12%. Only Sweden and the UK would not 
benefit – apparently they are at the least-restrictive level already. Even if this exercise is a 
radical simulation, it does show that the domestic services reform potential in the EU is still 
quite large. 
3.4  How the single services market can contribute to EU growth 
A  second  strategy  to  get  long-term  growth  from  services  markets  is  to  enhance  services 
exchange amongst the member states, and where possible beyond the single market with 
third countries, too. However, there is no clear economic distinction between the reforms at 
domestic  level  and  the  deepening  and  widening  of  the  single  services  market.  This  is 
explained by several unavoidable interdependencies between the national and EU level of 
reform. First, the implementation of the horizontal services Directive must imply that some 
national  regulation  is  made  less  restrictive  or  is  removed,  and  this  of  course  in  a  non-
discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the practical manifestation of the services directive inside 
every  member  state  amounts  to  less  or  less  intrusive/restrictive  regulation,  whether  for 
domestic  or  cross-border  purposes.  In  other  words,  the  horizontal  services  Directive  is 
tantamount to a (selective, but non-negligible) domestic pro-competitive regulatory reform 
in services markets. The consequence for empirical economic research is immediate: not only 
will the removal or lowering of services barriers create a more pro-competitive environment 
by boosting services imports, which would eventually lead to higher efficiency generating 
economic  growth  (the  traditional  economic  impact  analysis  of  border  obstacles),  but  the SECURING EU GROWTH FROM SERVICES | 17 
 
implementation  will  also  reform  the  domestic  services  markets,  which  is  bound  to  have 
similar effects on growth via domestic activity, not imports. Because intra-EU cross-border 
services  imports are not,  on  average,  a  large  share  of  domestic  services  turnover, such  a 
domestic reform is likely to engender a larger economic impact than the pure cross-border 
effect itself.  
It is important to see that this interdependence goes beyond cross-border intra-EU services 
trade  and  also  affects  the  local  services  provision  by  foreign  affiliates.  Companies 
undertaking FDI  tend  to  be  competitive  as  their  foreign  venture  usually  rests  on  certain 
company-specific advantages or higher efficiency. Hence, FATS20 are likely to benefit from a 
more competitive services environment created by domestic reforms, induced by the services 
Directive, but – in addition – there may well be a dynamic effect of inducing additional FDI 
in services. This is to be expected for two reasons: first, the services Directive has resolutely 
removed all problematic obstacles to the right of establishment of services companies, and, 
second, FDI of competitive service providers will be even more attractive due to the implied 
domestic reforms which give such competitors better opportunities. The presumption that 
FATS are competitive, and hence capable of benefiting from the new business environment, 
is supported by the empirical literature on FDI. 
Second, insofar as domestic services regulation is justified by market failures, cross-border 
EU  services  provision  cannot  expect  such  regulation  to  go  away  via  (say)  a  horizontal 
liberalisation directive. However, services exporters in the EU will still have great difficulties 
developing an EU market strategy, for the simple reason that national services regulation 
often differs somewhat from EU country to EU country. This is even true for sectors subject 
to some  or  perhaps  considerable  EU  regulation  (e.g.  eComms;  gas  &  electricity;  financial 
services).  This  ‘regulatory  heterogeneity’  can  be  very  costly  to  business  with  a  European 
focus – for every country, fixed entry costs will be incurred separately, which will have to be 
earned back before the investment and entry become profitable. Such recurrent fixed entry 
costs are extremely discouraging for services SMEs and at the very least not a help for many 
other  providers.  Thus,  much  more  than  for  goods,  services  export  strategies  suffer  from 
intra-EU  regulatory  heterogeneity.  The  second  interdependence  consists  therefore  of  the 
beneficial impact of domestic reforms in services on the single services market whenever 
such reforms reduce regulatory heterogeneity. Reduced regulatory heterogeneity may be the 
result of i) the horizontal services Directive, for the simple reason that many domestic rules 
are abolished or become less intrusive, which must lower regulatory heterogeneity; ii) pro-
competitive  domestic  reforms  that  go  beyond  the  services  Directive  (since  it  is  not  all-
encompassing);  and  iii)  even  when  domestic  regulation  is  justified,  harmonisation  at  EU 
level is agreed with a view to lower or eliminate such regulatory variety. 
                                                   
20 The European Commission, together with other international bodies, supports the construction of 
the  Foreign  Affiliates  Statistics  (or  FATS)  database,  a  comprehensive  source  of  variables  for  the 
monitoring of the activities of a foreign-controlled (or controlling) company after its establishment. 
FATS are,  at  least theoretically,  the response to two  main  problems:  first, they  disaggregate  data, 
allowing a better understanding of the effect of trade in services through mode 3 and look closer to the 
firm dimension. Trade (not only in services) takes place between firms and not between countries. 
Second, FATS represent a sub-set of the FDI world by including only affiliates controlled by a foreign 
investor (owning at least the 50% of the shares or voting power). FATS monitors the economic activity 
of  the  controlled/controlling  establishment  through  variables  (sales/turnover,  employment,  value 
added,  number  of  enterprises)  referring  to  the  overall  operations  that  concern  foreign  affiliates’ 
activities. The statistics are defined at firm-level and subsequently grouped by country and sectors; 
they are compiled both for foreign affiliates in the compiling economy (inward FATS) and for affiliates 
of the compiling economy (outward FATS).  18 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
Altogether,  we  have  identified  the  following  possible  economic  effects  of  the  services 
Directive:  i)  the  increase  in  intra-EU  services  imports,  hence,  a  more  competitive 
environment, as barriers are lowered or removed; ii) the concomitant reform of domestic 
services  regulation  insofar  as  the  Directive  requires  this  in  order  to  remove  the  barriers, 
hence,  a  more  competitive  environment  irrespective  of  (more)  imports;  iii)  the  (positive) 
impact on intra-EU FDI in services (in particular, since restrictions on incoming FDI have 
been removed by the Directive); iv) the (presumably positive) impact on cross-border FDI 
induced by the greater market opportunities as a result of the concomitant domestic services 
reforms; v) the expected leadership in market selection by FATS as they can be assumed to 
be  competitive  and  are  best  able  to  benefit  from  the  more  pro-competitive  domestic 
environment  in  each  member  state;  vi)  the  benefits  from  a  lowering  of  regulatory 
heterogeneity as induced by the Directive; and vii) the benefits from selected harmonisation 
of  national  regulation  justified  by  market  failures,  yet  distinct  in  practical  details  and 
requirements.  
Economic literature on these various economic impacts is still relative scarce. Early studies 
on item (i) include Breuss & Badinger (2006) and Badinger et al. (2008). The first study, based 
on a partial equilibrium approach, finds an increase on the aggregate EU GDP of 0.7%. Using 
the same approach, Badinger et al (2008) estimated a GDP growth of 1.5%, including as well 
the effects of decreasing barriers to FDI in services (in fact, they found an increase of 18.9% in 
inward  FDI  stocks  in  selected  service  sectors).  The  elimination  of  the  country-of-origin-
principle, as was done in the finally legislated services Directive, lowers GDP growth by 
0.5% to 1%. Also CopenhagenEconomics (2005a) finds an increase in EU GDP of 0.6% based 
on  the  first  Bolkestein  draft  with  the  origin  principle.  An  update  of  the  study 
(CopenhagenEconomics, 2005b) concluded that the CoOP (country of origin principle) was 
good for 7-9% of the trade gains from the Directive. Apart from technical issues of how these 
estimates have been arrived at, there is the considerable problem of identifying the services 
barriers which – in those days – was still very difficult indeed. One might employ the OECD 
PMRs,  but  these  are  not  defined  or  meant  as  ‘barriers’  and  their  use  inside  the  EU  is 
somewhat problematic anyway (Pelkmans, 2010). That is why the study by Monteagudo et 
al. (2012) constitutes a major improvement. This Commission study is more firmly based on 
the identification of intra-EU services barriers (as a result of the ‘mutual evaluation’ exercise 
between the EU member states), both before the directive and after implementation. Another 
merit  is  that  it  analyses  both  items  (i)  and  (ii).  Using  simple  restrictiveness  indices,  the 
authors arrive at an estimated EU GDP increase of 0.8% (for EU countries, ranging from 0.3% 
to 1.5%) for the state of implementation in 2011. The implied effects on intra-EU services 
trade (7%) and FDI in services (4%) are only incorporated as far as short-run competitive 
effects are concerned; their long-run effects should further augment the overall economic 
impact.  Some  80%  of  the  GDP  increment  is  reaped  within  five  years.  These  gains  are 
relatively modest for item (i); most of it arises from the benefits of the implied domestic 
reform of services regulation (item (ii)) as domestic market activity is far larger. Simulated 
gains would augment with another 0.4% if member states would move to the average EU 
restrictiveness  level  but  with  no  less  than  1.6%  if  all  EU  countries  would  adopt  services 
regulation no more restrictive than the five least-restrictive EU member states.21  
On item (iii) Badinger et al. (2008) find a GDP growth of 1.5% and Monteagudo et al. (2012) 
an increase of FDI inflows of 4%. As far as we know, there is no study separating out the 
effects on intra-EU FDI in the medium run attracted by the greater market opportunities 
                                                   
21 The  authors  also  simulate  the  economic  impact  of  lower  information  and  transaction  costs  as 
achieved with the Points of Single Contact introduced by the Directive in all EU countries. They find a 
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inside member states as  a  result  of  the  domestic  services  reform  implied  by  the services 
Directive (item (iv)). The literature on FATS is still scant and none of the contributions so far 
has addressed item (v). Kox & Lejour (2006) have done groundbreaking work on the impact 
of the services directive at a time that the identification of intra-EU barriers was still very 
problematic.  That  is  why  they  turned  to  an  indirect  empirical  approach,  the  effects  of 
lowering  regulatory  heterogeneity  (item  (vi))  resulting  from  the  implementation  of  the 
Directive.  They  argue,  with some justification,  that  heterogeneity  amounts to  fixed  entry 
costs which are specific to each national services market in the EU and sunk. Of course, quite 
apart from regulatory barriers to imports, these fixed entry qualifications are rather costly 
and  tend  to  deter  entry,  certainly  when  an  EU-wide  strategy  would  be  considered.  The 
Bolkestein draft directive (with the origin principle still in it) would induce an increase of 30-
62% of intra-EU services trade (i.e. some 2-5% of total EU trade) and augment by 18-36% 
intra-EU FDI in services (Kox & Lejour, 2006), which, in simulations, leads to an increase of 
(2004) EU GDP of some 0.5-1.5% (Lejour, 2008). The authors also simulate the impact of the 
full  removal  of  all  regulatory  heterogeneity,  which  yields  amazing  results:  intra-EU  FDI 
would increase by 30% and intra-EU (market) services trade would triple!  
Item (vii) is about the benefits of selected harmonisation of national services regulation, even 
when  justified.  Harmonisation  is  not  necessarily  a  ‘good’  thing,  in  particular  not  when 
countries attach value to diversity based on distinct national preferences, in sharp contrast to 
mere  heterogeneity  in  procedural  or  technical  details  grown  out  of  forgotten  legislative 
origins whilst the respective national laws serve equivalent objectives. In the presence of 
such diversity, harmonisation would result in welfare losses for countries cherishing deeply 
felt  preferences.  However,  in  goods  markets,  the  EU  has  found  out  over  time  that 
equivalence of objectives is the routine, and exceptions with deeply felt preferences are rare 
(e.g. GMOs for some countries). It is thus reasonable to expect that selected harmonisation 
would help to bring down regulatory heterogeneity and benefit the EU at large. Two types of 
studies have emerged in this respect. One category comprises sectoral or specific case studies 
where  much  of  the  heterogeneity  seems  purely  a  relic  of  the  past,  but  adjustment  to  a 
common solution (and its initial costs) are not easily accepted. Box 1 provides a battery of 
examples raising costs in the EU single market.  
 
Box 1. Pointless regulatory heterogeneity in the single services market 
Regulatory autonomy of member states can lead to extra costs and waste, also in services, if 
national regulations and procedures do not differ on grounds of truly distinct preferences. 
There may simply be turf fights or an unwillingness to cede power or to compromise on long-
standing practices. In banking supervision, there used to be some 150 exceptions to EU rules 
and it is only because of the deep financial crisis that the pursuit of a common rule book has 
now  become  acceptable.  In  telecoms,  the  European  Commission  has  complained  for  years 
about inconsistencies in the application of EU rules due to national regulatory autonomy. This 
is  often  linked  to  disparities  in  the  degree  of  competition  in  national  telecoms  markets. 
ECORYS et al. (2010), found that if best-practice competition would be EU-wide in this respect, 
EU GDP might increase with up to 0.44% In e-commerce, the differences in e-Identification and 
e-Authorisation are notorious and efforts in overcoming these in the EU Digital Agenda have 
only just begun. In rail, infrastructure user fees differ enormously between member states, far 
more than can ever be justified by cost differentials. For rail freight services, this matters a lot 
because rail freight is only economical (in most instances) on EU corridors crossing several 
countries.  In  air  transport  services,  the  absurdity  of  maintaining  nearly  50  areas  of  traffic 
control is still not fully solved despite the Single European Sky.  
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A new study by CopenhagenEconomics (2012) of ten problem cases in the single market lists 
the  following  for  services:  i)  fragmented  data  protection  rules  hindering  the  provision  of 
European digital services; ii) private copying levies differ substantially between member states 
hindering  the  EU  market  for  digital  devices  and  media  services;  iii)  in  renewable  energy 
services,  national  subsidy  schemes  differ  a  great  deal,  distorting  the  single  market;  iv)  in 
railway services, different national approval regimes of the EU signalling and train control 
system  (ERMTS)  create  barriers  for  foreign  suppliers  and  services;  v)  significant  (de  facto 
national) derogations in SEPA, the EU single payments system, water down the benefits of 
SEPA; and vi) direct sellers are confronted with differing sales laws of the member states. 
 
Another (small) category relates to more general quantifications or simulations. Somewhat 
extreme simulations, as quoted above, seem to indicate that voluntary harmonisation can 
pay off, even if selective. Thus, Nordås & Kox (2009) find that their bilateral heterogeneity 
indicator  (for  services)  has  a  large  and  negative  impact  on  bilateral  FDI  stocks.  Quite 
suggestive  is  their  result  that  the  effect  of  being  a  member  of  the  EU  disappears  when 
regulatory heterogeneity is explicitly included in the regression on regulation and FDI. The 
authors  show  that  a  limited  reduction  of  regulatory  heterogeneity  in  the  OECD  already 
yields  substantial  increases  in  incoming  FDI.  These  exercises  suggest  that  the  horizontal 
services  directive,  which  avoids  harmonisation,  might  selectively  be  followed  up  with 
voluntary harmonisation to the benefit of all.22  
A  special  case  is  the  Digital  Single  Market,  linked  to  a  broader  Agenda  of  what  the 
Commission  calls  ‘performance  targets’  on  broadband  access,  cross-border  intra-EU  e-
Commerce, e-Inclusion, R&D in ICT and public services under e-Government. The Digital 
Single Market assumes a much broader view than merely the (deep) fragmentation of the 
market  for  digital  services,  due  to  differences  in  data  protection  or  (no)  pan-European 
licensing  for  online  rights  management  or  (the  lack  of)  an  EU  online  dispute  resolution 
system for e-Commerce or a range of issues with respect to ICT interoperability standards. It 
is also about the demand side (e-skills or e-Inclusion), specific ICT application on a large 
scale (e.g. smart grids, digitisation of the cinema, rail passenger services, etc.) and active 
promotion  of  performance  ‘benchmarks’.  By  explicitly  linking  network  issues,  demand, 
supply, R&D, the creation of content and single market issues, it is hoped to maximise the 
economic and social potential of ICT in the EU. In such a context, it becomes more difficult 
and perhaps inappropriate to try to isolate pure cross-border ‘barriers’ to digital services and 
the  economic  impact  of  their  removal  or  common  regulation.  Before  the  Commission’s 
Digital  Agenda  was  published  (European  Commission,  2010a),  CopenhagenEconomics 
(2010) claimed that a single EU digital market might generate no less than 4% additional EU 
GDP. Since this refers to an amalgam of measures and effects, it is bound to overlap to a 
considerable degree with several of the elements discussed above. 
4.  Conclusions 
Since the mid-1990s, both EU member states and the EU level itself have realised ever more 
that services markets in Europe were underperforming, to the detriment of medium and 
long-run economic growth. For EU countries, empirical evidence about the trend reduction 
of the restrictiveness of services regulation over this period is clear and convincing. As we 
                                                   
22  A  more  informal  but  telling  result  which  supports  the  gains  from  reducing  regulatory 
heterogeneity, can be found in the European Business Test Panel (2009), in which thousands of SMEs 
participated.  The  co-existence  of  different  rules  in  EU  member  states  is  strongly  resisted  by  the 
companies. No less than 50% of the firms in the sample would start trading across intra-EU borders if 
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have shown, the potential for further reforms in domestic services markets is nonetheless 
considerable  and  indications  are  that  such  reforms  would  yield  substantial  productivity 
increases. At EU level, the horizontal service Directive has been enacted and implemented 
with special efforts, including the screening of thousands of national and regional laws and 
the  ‘mutual  evaluation’  amongst  member  states.  Moreover,  in  other  domains  such  as 
network  industries,  professional services  and  financial  services,  progress  has  been made. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  not yet  a  single services market.  The  empirical  economic  literature 
suggests that the further pursuit of the single services market is likely to generate additional 
economic growth.  
Our main conclusions are presented below.  
i. Domestic and EU-level services reforms tend to be economically intertwined. This is true, 
by definition, if one looks at national implementation simply as a way for member states to 
comply with the liberalisation under the services Directive. However, it is also true from the 
perspective of the overarching common objective of fostering EU growth (say, under Art. 
121, TFEU). This implies deep domestic services reforms resulting in more competitive and 
better-functioning  services  markets  everywhere,  which  are  quintessential  and  far  more 
important for EU growth than exposure to e.g. cross-border intra-EU services trade. 
ii. More competitive services markets matter for the competitiveness of European industry, 
including firms’ advantages in EU companies’ global value chains. Indeed, the 'knock-on' 
effects from services (as inputs to industry) can be effectively mitigated by allowing market 
selection induced by greater competitive pressures in business services. This will often result 
in a somewhat larger firm size and less inefficiency. 
iii. EU and domestic services reforms (and to some extent, labour reforms as well) are one 
among several factors needed to better exploit ICT in EU user industries and user services 
sectors.  This  is  especially  linked  to  the  swift  introduction  of  new  ICT-driven  business 
models,  flexible,  yet  effective  intra-firm  organisation  and  radically  new  patterns  of  ICT-
related innovation.  
iv.  Simulations  of  domestic  reforms  bringing  EU  countries’  regulatory  restrictiveness  to 
best-practice  levels  (without  affecting  the  solution  to  market  failures)  show  very 
substantial productivity improvements for many countries. 
v. The gains from realizing a fully-fledged EU internal market for services (that is, much 
beyond the horizontal services directive) are still not fully understood. In financial services, 
no new estimates seem available yet, whilst in network industries there are only some ad hoc 
attempts (pointing to fairly substantial gains); in professional services no reliable estimates 
are  available.  In  all  three,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  genuine  single  market,  which  is 
suggestive  of  considerable  further  gains;  the  manifold  economic  gains  from  the  services 
Directive are beginning to be understood only now and the medium- as well as longer-run 
gains are almost certainly adding up to several percentage points of EU GDP, if not more. 
Adding to the long-neglected benefits of less regulatory heterogeneity in services, gains are 
much higher still. 
vi. Reaping the gains from better functioning services markets is not always just a matter of 
greater competition, engendered by pro-competitive reforms, possibly helped by selective 
harmonisation  at  EU  level.  In  several  network  industries,  it  requires  considerable 
infrastructural investments (gas, electricity, rail, internet) over longer periods throughout the 
Union. A  unique  case  is  the  digital  single  market,  coupled  with  a  much  broader  Digital 
Agenda where various supply and demand issues, R&D in ICT, harmonisation questions, 
interoperability  standards,  benchmarking  of  performance  and  e-government  are  brought 
together to leverage digital services in Europe. 22 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
 
Altogether, one can speak of a ’double-dividend’ strategy: what member states are expected 
to do in terms of reforms (whether due to the Lisbon process or recommendations under Art. 
121, TFEU or in the European Semester or in the light of enlightened self-interest) also serves 
the broader goal of EU economic growth, whereas the EU pursuit of the single market in 
services  not  only  serves  this  goal  (as  this  report  shows)  but,  in  turn,  helps  directly  the 
national  reform  efforts  as  well.  Both  will  indirectly  be  helpful  for the  competitiveness  of 
European industrial firms, too.  
One can go one step further for the eurozone which may enjoy a ‘triple dividend’, because 
promoting domestic services reform helps the proper functioning of monetary union. A well 
functioning  monetary  union  must  have  a  smooth  and  swiftly  working  adjustment 
mechanism. More precisely, one would like to see relatively low-cost and rapid absorption of 
(especially idiosyncratic) shocks which minimises the cumulative loss of growth from such 
shocks. This is crucial for a monetary union because it needs to have alternative adjustment 
channels as nominal exchange rate changes are no longer available. Services reform would 
best go hand-in-hand with labour market reforms as they are complementary and can also 
reinforce each other (because services are very labour intensive). In Pelkmans et al. (2008), a 
theoretical survey is complemented by an empirical economic analysis of national services 
market reforms that are ‘lubricating’ the adjustment processes in the euro area.23 In fact, one 
can speak of a ‘triple dividend’ because this lubrication comes on top of the double dividend 
discussed above.  Since the euro is a common good to the euro countries, one can justify a 
more binding approach for these domestic reforms than on the basis of Art. 121, TFEU. A 
fortiori, this holds for euro countries having received rescue funds for their sovereign debt, 
as they have a duty to improve their competitiveness and restore growth so as to be able to 
pay back these funds and rectify their debt exposures.  
   
                                                   
23 The empirical results show clear differentiations between eurozone countries and between sectors at 
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•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 